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Abstract 
 
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are a new policy instrument designed to help the poor 
save and accumulate assets. IDAs provide matches for savings used for home purchase, post-
secondary education, or microenterprise. IDAs cannot help participants, however, if they drop 
out. What determines drop-out, and what can be done to help participants to stay in? Three 
findings emerge from an analysis of IDAs in the American Dream Demonstration. First, drop-out 
depends more on transaction costs and previous debt than on income. Second, program design—
and match rates in particular—affect drop-out risk. Third, drop-out can be predicted with some 
accuracy, so IDA programs could use statistical targeting to identify candidates for special 
preventive attention before they drop out. 
  
 
Drop-out from Individual Development Accounts: 
Prediction and Prevention 
 
1. Introduction 
To escape from poverty requires saving and asset accumulation. Many U.S. programs subsidize 
savings, but low-income people rarely take full advantage of them because the incentive systems 
require participants to have wealth already, to be in high tax brackets, or to take on debt. 
 
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are a new policy instrument designed to help the poor 
to save and to accumulate assets (Sherraden, 1991). IDAs do not require existing wealth, do not 
work through tax breaks, and do not require borrowing. IDAs provide matches for savings used 
to build human capital (through post-secondary education), physical capital (through home 
purchase), or business capital (through microenterprise). IDAs also seek to build human capital 
(through financial education) and social capital (through support from peers and program staff). 
In sum, the match and the institutional structure of IDAs seek to address obstacles to savings by 
the poor so as to foster their long-term personal development. 
 
IDAs, however, do ask participants to save, and saving requires reduced consumption and/or 
increased work. Because IDAs require short-term sacrifice, the poorest (or those who do not 
already have savings that they can readily shift to IDAs) may choose not to sign up. Even if the 
poorest do sign up, they may be more likely—because the sacrifice of saving is greatest for those 
who have the least—to drop out. 
 
Drop-out is costly all around; programs lose their investment in participants, and participants 
lose potential match funds. Worse yet, drop-outs from IDAs may become discouraged with 
saving in general. How common is drop-out in IDA programs? Do the very poor drop out more 
than the less-poor? Is program design linked with drop-out? Can at-risk participants be identified 
for preventive attention before it is too late? 
 
This paper addresses these questions with data from IDAs in the American Dream 
Demonstration (ADD). About 16 percent of participants in ADD dropped out. Three findings 
emerge from an analysis of the association between drop-out and the characteristics of 
participants and programs: 
 
 
 
 
• Participants who had low debt or low transaction costs in making deposits were less likely to 
drop-out, but the level of income had no association with drop-out. 
• Higher match rates were associated with less risk of drop-out. Furthermore, other unobserved 
program characteristics were strongly linked with drop-out. 
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 • Statistical targeting based on characteristics observed at enrollment has some power to 
identify those participants with the highest risk of drop-out. 
 
Thus, drop-out depends partly on factors that IDA programs can manage. In particular, drop-out 
is not purely a function of income, something IDA programs have little control over. Programs 
can reduce drop-out, for example by raising match rates, by counseling participants with large 
debts, or by working to decrease transaction costs, perhaps by arranging for direct deposit with 
employers or by training participants in checkbook management or in the use of automatic teller 
machines. Such prevention efforts are costly, but they can be targeted to the most at-risk 
participants.  
 
Section 2 below describes drop-out from IDAs in ADD. Sections 3 and 4 relate drop-out to 
characteristics of participants and programs. Section 5 tests the predictive power of a statistical 
targeting model, and Section 6 summarizes policy implications. 
 
2. Drop-out from IDAs in ADD 
 
2.1 The American Dream Demonstration 
 
ADD comprises 14 IDA programs across the United States. Between July 1997 and June 30, 
2000, 2,378 participants opened an IDA in ADD (Schreiner et al., 2001). 
 
Data on ADD come from administrative software used by the IDA programs (Johnson, 
Hinterlong, and Sherraden, 2001). The system records account structures, participant 
characteristics, and monthly IDA cash flows. The cash flows are accurate and complete; they 
come from bank records, satisfy accounting identities, and were extensively cross-checked. They 
may be the best high-frequency data on matched savings by the poor. 
 
2.2 Drop-out 
 
Participants who leave ADD without a matched withdrawal are drop-outs. As of June 30, 2000, 
about 16 percent of ADD participants had dropped out.1 
 
Of course, observed drop-out is censored; some active participants as of June 30, 2000 might still 
drop out after that. Figure 1 is a Kaplan-Meier hazard function that controls for censoring. It 
shows the relationship between the risk of drop-out and months of participation. Risk increases 
from almost zero in the first month to a peak of about 1.6 percent in month 6. (That is, 1.6 
percent of participants who reached month 6 then dropped out in month 6.) Drop-out risk 
averaged about 1 percent per month for months 7-17, but then it fell to about 0.25 percent per 
month for months 18-24. 
 
                                                          
1 Some drop-outs may have been kicked out for disobeying programs rules, for example for 
missing required financial-education classes. The data do not distinguish between drop-outs and 
kick-outs, although most kick-outs probably would have dropped-out later anyway. Schreiner et 
al. (2001) discuss this and other data issues. 
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 Figure 2 shows cumulative drop-out risk. Controlling for censoring, 11 percent dropped out in 
their first 12 months, 14 percent in their first 18 months, and 16 percent in their first 24 months. 
Both the highest drop-out rates and the most drop-outs occurred between months 2 and 14. 
 
2.3 Discussion  
 
Given the patterns in Figures 1 and 2, perhaps one-fifth to one-fourth of ADD participants will 
drop out. These drop-outs are costly all around. For programs, they are costly because they 
usually take place only after enrollment, counseling, and financial education, the most costly 
stages of IDA programs (Schreiner, 2001a; Sherraden, 2000). For participants, drop-outs are 
costly because they lose potential match funds, because they decrease consumption and/or 
increase work in vain, and because, after failing to save under the facilitating institutional 
structure of IDAs, they may despair at ever saving again. What can be done to prevent these 
costs? 
 
3. Participant Characteristics 
If programs knew how participant characteristics related to drop-out risk, then they might be able 
to do something about it. The regression results described below suggest that low-income per se 
does not drive drop-out; rather, what matters are previous savings, previous debt, and the 
transaction costs of making deposits. 
 
3.1 Probit on drop-out  
Participants are assumed to drop-out if the benefits of doing so exceed the costs. The structural 
random-utility model used here boils down to a Probit regression of drop-out on a wide range of 
participant and program characteristics (Schreiner et al., 2001; Greene, 1993). To account for 
censoring, a spline in months of participation is included. Thus, the Probit resembles a hazard 
model with a semi-parametric baseline (Kennedy, 1998). The dependent variable is unity (1.00) 
for drop-outs and zero otherwise, so positive coefficients indicate a positive association with 
drop-out risk.2 
 
The Probit includes an unusually large number of independent variables: 9 program 
characteristics, and 27 participant characteristics. Because some characteristics are 
polychotomous, because some continuous characteristics are specified as piece-wise linear 
splines3, and because many characteristics have many missing values4, 99 parameters were 
estimated.  
                                                          
2 Compared with Schreiner et al. (2001), this convention reverses the signs on the coefficients, 
but it affects nothing of substance. 
3 Suits, Mason, and Chan (1978). 
4 Following Orme and Reis (1991), each variable with many missing values has a corresponding 
dummy variable. When the “original” variable is not missing, then its dummy is set to zero. 
When the “original” is missing, then it is set to zero and its dummy is set to unity. Assuming that 
the presence of missing values is uncorrelated with drop-out, this cleanses the estimates of the 
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The model includes 2,338 participants (40 were omitted due to missing values). The log-
likelihood is −457, and the Probit differs statistically from an intercept-only model with 99-
percent confidence. Comparing pairs of cases in which one was a drop-out and the other was not, 
the predicted risk of drop-out was higher for the drop-out 95 percent of the time. Overall, the 
model had a good fit. 
 
3.2 Regression results 
 
Tables 1 through 8 display means for the independent variables, estimated marginal effects in 
units of percentage points, and p-values.5 Although presented in 8 tables, all the results come 
from a single regression. Space limits dictate discussing only the most interesting results.6 
 
 
 
3.2.1 Race/ethnicity 
Drop-out risk is about the same for African Americans, Caucasians, Hispanics, and Asian 
Americans (Table 1). Native Americans are more at-risk, and “other” is less at-risk. Age and 
location of residence are linked with drop-out, but programs have little control over these 
characteristics. 
 
3.2.2 Income and public assistance 
Did the poorest IDA participants—those with very low income or those who received public 
assistance—drop-out more? The specification of income (Table 3) distinguishes between 
recurrent income (wages, retirement benefits, and public assistance) and intermittent income 
(self-employment, child support, gifts, investments, and “other”) because a large body of theory 
and evidence (e.g., Thaler and Shefrin, 1981) suggests that the propensity to save varies with the 
source of the income. To allow for different effects at very low income versus at higher incomes, 
recurrent income is represented by a two-piece spline. None of the estimates is statistically 
significant; it appears that income does not matter for saving in IDAs.7 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
effects of missing values and—more importantly—avoids the common practice of throwing out 
cases with any missing values and thus decimating the data set. (Dummy results are available on 
request.) 
5 Marginal effects (computed at the sample means) are shown because the Probit coefficients 
have no direct interpretation. Standard errors come from the delta method. 
6 Schreiner et al. (2001) discuss regression results in greater detail. 
7 The analysis experimented with many specifications of income (for example, without 
distinguishing between recurrent and intermittent, and without splines), but nothing ever came 
close to statistical significance. Sherraden and Schreiner (this issue) discuss in detail the 
relationship between income and savings in IDAs. 
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Nor was receipt of public assistance strongly linked with drop-out (Table 3). Although this does 
not necessarily mean that IDAs are a good way to help people on public assistance, it does mean 
that unobserved characteristics associated with the receipt of public assistance (such as a 
supposed “culture of welfare”) were not also associated with drop-out risk. 
 
3.2.3 Liquid assets 
 
The presence of a checking account was linked with a large decrease in drop-out. Also, each 
additional $100 of checking balances was associated with slightly lower risk. Although these 
links are not particularly large or strong, they do suggest that people with checking accounts 
were less likely to drop-out of IDAs in ADD. The presence of a checking account may be a mere 
correlate of low drop-out risk (for example, if financial sophistication makes people both more 
likely to own a checking account and more likely to save successfully in IDAs) or a cause of low 
risk (for example, if checking-account owners avoid the transaction costs of making deposits by 
mailing checks in.) 
 
The presence of a passbook savings account had no link with drop-out risk. Passbook savings 
balances were linked with a very small increase in the risk of drop-out (Table 4), about 0.04 
percentage points for each additional $100. This fits evidence in Hogarth and Lee (2000) that 
suggests that owners of passbook savings accounts resemble the unbanked more closely than 
they resemble checkbook owners. 
 
3.2.4 Illiquid assets 
 
Although home owners were just as likely to drop out as renters (Table 4), participants who 
owned a car were much less likely to drop out than participants who did not own a car. Again, a 
car likely decreases the transaction costs of making deposits; without a car, the value of time 
spent walking or in public transportation could easily swamp the value of the deposit itself 
(Adams, 1995). Car ownership also decreases the marginal cost of attending required financial-
education classes. 
 
3.2.5 Liabilities 
 
Participants with debt were more likely to drop out (Table 4), perhaps because they had greater 
pressure on cash flows and/or had less savings to shift into IDAs. 
 
3.2.6 Direct deposit 
 
ADD participants who used direct deposit to their IDA account were 2.7 percentage points less 
likely to drop out. Given an average drop-out risk of 16 percent, this is a huge effect. Like 
ownership of a checking account, the use of direct deposit may be a mere correlate with low 
drop-out risk, but, again like ownership of a checking account, for some participants it is almost 
certainly a cause. 
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 3.3 Policy implications 
 
Did the very poor drop out more? No; results here suggest that transaction costs (proxied by car 
ownership, checking-account ownership, and the use of direct deposit) mattered more than level 
of income. Also, debt was linked with increased drop out. 
 
The policy implications are clear: IDA programs can reduce drop-out by reducing the transaction 
costs of making deposits and by helping participants manage their debt. To do this, programs 
might require participants to set up direct deposit or to open checking accounts. In the required 
financial-education classes, the programs might teach participants how to manage checkbooks 
and how to manage debt. IDA programs might also coordinate car pools, both to make deposits 
and to attend classes. Finally, IDA programs might counsel participants with large debts even 
before enrollment, perhaps encouraging some of them to enroll only after getting their debt under 
control. 
 
4. Program design 
 
For controlling drop-out, program design matters more than participant characteristics because 
policy directly affects program design. The Probit model shows that several elements of program 
design strongly influence drop-out. 
 
4.1 Match rates 
 
The central feature of IDAs is the match. In ADD, 51 percent of participants had a 2:1 match 
rate, 24 percent had a 1:1 match, 14 percent had 3:1, and 6 percent had match rates from 4:1 to 
7:1 (Table 7). Higher match rates, because they increase the cost of lost potential matches, 
should reduce drop-out (Schreiner, 2001b). 
 
This turns out to be the case. Compared with a match rate of 1:1, match rates of 2:1 had 1 
percentage point less drop-out risk, match rates of 3:1 had 3.1 percentage points less risk, and 
match rates from 4:1 to 7:1 had 4.7 percentage points less risk. Higher match rates reduce drop-
out. 
 
4.2 Monthly savings target 
 
Match-eligible deposits in IDAs are capped, either year-by-year or for the lifetime of ADD. The 
match cap divided by the number of months the capped period is the monthly savings target. 
This is a target in two ways. First, it is the amount which, if saved each month, would produce 
savings equal to the match cap. Second, many programs in ADD explicitly exhort participants to 
save this amount each month. 
 
A $10 increase in the monthly savings target was associated with a decrease in drop-out risk of 
0.5 percentage points (Table 7). Given that savings targets are bunched in the range of $40-$60, 
a $10 increase is fairly large, but so is a 0.5 percentage-point decrease in drop-out risk. 
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 Three factors contribute to this result (Schreiner, 2001b and Schreiner et al., 2001). The first is 
opportunity costs; participants allowed to save more have more to lose by dropping out. Second, 
the institutional theory of saving (Beverly and Sherraden, 1999) suggests that people save more 
if they are expected to save more and are assisted in doing so. Third, IDA programs in ADD may 
have assigned higher targets to groups whom they expected to save more, creating an 
endogenous link between savings targets and savings ability that would contribute to the positive 
association found here. 
 
4.3 Match-cap structure and program inputs 
 
Drop-out risk is not associated with the match-cap structure, be it annual or lifetime (Table 7). 
There are some odd associations between drop-out and program inputs, probably artifacts of 
noise in this part of the data set (Schreiner et al., 2001).8  
 
4.4 Unobserved program characteristics 
Observed characteristics in the model constant, the risk of drop-out varied greatly across the 14 
programs in ADD (Table 8). These “fixed effects” are due partly to unobserved variation in local 
contexts, partly to variation in unobserved participant characteristics among programs, and partly 
to variation in unobserved elements of program design such as informal social support, strictness 
of rule enforcement, wait periods before matched withdrawals, and quality of financial 
education. 
 
Again, the lesson is that program design matters. Knowledge of exactly what elements of design 
matter, however, must await future work. 
 
4.5 Policy implications 
  
Upping the ante by raising match rates and match caps increases the cost of drop-out and so 
effectively decreases drop-out. On the positive side, this would also allow poor people to 
accumulate more assets through IDAs. On the negative side, it would also increase costs.  
 
5. Statistical targeting of drop-out prevention 
 
One way to control costs is to target drop-out prevention—such as higher match rates or higher 
match caps—only to the most at-risk participants. But who are they?  
 
Statistical targeting attempts to identify at-risk participants based on their characteristics at 
enrollment. It is triage, focusing extra attention where it is likely to have the greatest impact. 
                                                          
8 Staff hours are significantly and positively associated with drop-out. Causality, however, likely 
goes from drop-out to staffing; IDA programs respond to high drop-out by adding staff and 
providing more intensive services. More staffing no more causes high drop-out than more 
prenatal medical care increases infant mortality, even though (ex post) high levels of medical 
care are positively associated with higher mortality.   
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 Statistical targeting is not new in the social services, being used to identify hard-to-employ 
people in welfare-to-work programs (Eberts, 2001) and people likely to exhaust their 
unemployment insurance (Decker and Dickinson, 1996).  
 
5.1 Statistical technique 
 
Statistical targeting uses a Probit model like the one discussed above. The goal, however, is not 
just to derive the relationships between characteristics and drop-out but rather also to use the 
knowledge of those relationships to predict risk. What matters are not marginal effects but rather 
predictive power. 
 
Statistical targeting constructs a regression from historical data on enrollees and drop-out. 
Combining the Probit estimates with the characteristics of a new enrollee gives an estimate of 
drop-out risk. Implementation is simple and can be automated; as soon as an enrollee’s 
characteristics are key-punched, the administrative software can compute drop-out risk. If risk is 
“high” (for example, in the top decile or quintile), then the IDA program might target preventive 
incentives and services to the participant.  
 
5.2 Tests of predictive power 
 
Fair tests of predictive power are “out-of-sample”; cases used to test the model are not also used 
to construct the model.9 For the test here, 1,900 of the 2,378 ADD cases were drawn at random 
and used to construct a new model with the same independent variables as above. Predicted risk 
was then computed from the Probit formula with the estimated coefficients and the 
characteristics of the 478 hold-out cases. 
 
Measures of predictive power compare predicted drop-out risk with realized drop-out. The two 
standard measures are the “power curve” (also known as the “Receiver Operating 
Characteristic”) and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance. Both measures suggest that the 
statistical targeting model was powerfully predictive. 
 
5.2.1 Power curve 
 
The power curve in Figure 3 relates the percentage of all cases targeted (horizontal axis) to the 
percentage of all drop-outs targeted (vertical axis). The diagonal is random targeting; for 
example, targeting 10 percent of all cases at random would mean targeting 10 percent of all 
drop-outs. The curved line is the result of the targeting model for drop-out from IDAs in ADD. 
Targeting is better as the curve is farther from the diagonal; a perfect model would form a right-
angled “r” (Hand, 1994). 
 
The curve in Figure 3 is quite far from the diagonal. For example, targeting the half of 
participants with the highest predicted risk would reach more than 90 percent of all drop-outs. 
                                                          
9 Using the same cases for both model and test would overstate predictive power. 
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 Perhaps more realistically, targeting the riskiest 10 percent would reach more than half of drop-
outs.10 
 
5.2.2 Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance 
 
The KS distance measures predictive power as the maximum distance between the cumulative 
distribution functions of predicted risk for drop-outs versus non-drop-outs. KS ranges from 0 (no 
predictive power at all) to 100 (perfect predictive power). According to Mays (2000), models are 
“good” if KS exceeds 40, “very good” if KS exceeds 50, and “awesome” if KS exceeds 60. For 
this targeting model, KS is 68. 
 
In sum, both the KS distance and the power curve suggest that IDA programs could use 
statistical models to target extra attention to participants at-risk of drop-out.  
 
6. Discussion 
 
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) aim to help the poor to save and accumulate assets by 
matching deposits used for home purchase, post-secondary education, or microenterprise. Some 
IDA participants, however, drop out without ever having taken a matched withdrawal. What 
determines drop-out, and what can be done to reduce it?  
 
Three main findings emerge from this analysis: 
• Transaction costs and previous debt affect drop-out more than does income. 
• Program design—especially match rates—affects drop-out risk. 
• Statistical models can target extra attention just to the most at-risk participants. 
 
6.1 Policy implications 
 
Given the importance of transaction costs, IDA programs might require participants to open 
checking accounts and perhaps even to sign up for direct deposit, both from the employer to the 
checking account and from the checking account to the IDA. At the very least, the financial-
education classes required of all IDA participants can focus on the benefits of both checking and 
direct deposit and on the basics of checkbook management. IDA programs might also facilitate 
car pools to help participants make deposits and attend classes. Given the weight of debt, IDA 
programs might screen new enrollees to make sure that they have a reasonable plan both to pay 
down debt and to build up IDA balances. Finally, given the importance of match rates (and to a 
lesser extent, match caps), IDA programs might increase matches (and perhaps also the amount 
eligible for matching). Statistical models can help programs target these costly preventative 
measures only to participants at high risk of drop-out. 
 
                                                          
10 Some IDA programs in ADD recorded almost no drop-out, so about 40 percent of participants 
had zero predicted (and realized) drop-out risk. Even with this group omitted, however, the 
model is still powerful; for example, an IDA program could reach more than half of would-be 
drop-outs by targeting 16 percent of all remaining cases.  
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 IDA programs could also reduce drop-out by reducing kick-out. Programs sometimes force 
participants out who save too little or too infrequently. If the goal of IDAs is long-term 
improvement in well-being, however, then it makes little sense to cut off access precisely to 
those participants for whom saving is most difficult. 
 
6.2 Abolishing drop-out from IDAs 
 
Making IDAs universal and permanent would completely abolish drop-out. Subsidized-savings 
programs for the non-poor such as Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) are universal and 
permanent—why not IDAs? 
 
From the perspective of long-term improvement in the well-being of the poor, the best IDA 
policy would involve permanent access (Schreiner et al., 2001). Then the poor could save in 
IDAs at their own pace; savings access would not depend on savings performance. Permanent 
access would also increase the sums that people could accumulate, and this could only boost 
developmental impact. 
 
In fact, the original proposal for IDAs calls for accounts for all, opened at birth, with greater 
subsidies for the poor (Sherraden, 1991). Everyone would always be a participant; people would 
not be “on” or “off” IDAs—even if they had zero balances or no recent deposits—any more than 
they are now “on” or “off” IRAs. Of course, not everyone would use their IDA at all times, but 
permanent incentives to build assets would likely foster development better than would time-
limited incentives. 
 
IDAs in ADD are not permanent because ADD, as a demonstration, has limited budget with time 
limits. ADD programs reserve funds for each enrollee equal to the match rate multiplied by 
lifetime match eligibility. Given that programs must want to show a good performance record to 
attract funding, this creates an incentive to kick out participants who cannot keep up with 
program saving targets. Kicking out poor performers not only frees up match funds for new 
enrollees and reduces operating costs but also inflates savings outcomes per non-exited 
participant reported to potential funders. Thus, the demonstration nature of ADD—and of IDAs 
in general up to this point—creates a dysfunction. The dysfunction is a goal displacement from 
long-term asset building to short-term saving performance. Until IDAs are federally funded (and 
thus potentially permanent and universal), the need to attract new funds will likely maintain this 
dysfunction.  
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 Figure 1: Risk of drop-out in a given month of participation    
             (Kaplan-Meier hazard) 
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 Figure 2: Cumulative risk of drop-out by length of participation 
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 Figure 3: Power curve for statistical targeting 
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 Table 1: Participant demographics 
 
Independent variable Mean 
Change in 
% points p-value 
Gender       
Male 0.20     
Female 0.80 −0.05 0.92 
        
Age (2-piece spline) 36     
0 to 40 years 33 +0.06 0.05 
40 years or more 2 −0.11 0.07 
        
Location of residence       
Population 2,500 or more 0.87     
Population less than 2,500 0.13 −2.5 0.02 
        
Marital status       
Widowed 0.02 +0.12 0.94 
Divorced or separated 0.27 −0.9 0.11 
Never-married 0.51     
Married 0.20 −0.83 0.19 
        
Household composition 3.2     
Adults (18 or older) 1.5 +0.19 0.51 
Children (17 or younger) 1.7 −0.15 0.28 
        
Participants in a household       
One 0.94     
More than one 0.06 +0.17 0.81 
        
Race/ethnicity       
Native American 0.03 +2.5 0.06 
African-American 0.47 +0.13 0.81 
Caucasian 0.37     
Hispanic 0.09 −0.2 0.82 
Asian-American 0.02 −1.5 0.40 
Other 0.03 −4.0 0.02 
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 Table 2: Education and employment status 
 
Independent variable Mean 
Change in 
% points p-value 
        
Education 1.00     
Did not graduate from high school 0.15     
Completed high school or earned GED 0.26 +0.8 0.18 
Attended college but did not graduate 0.37 +0.8 0.18 
Graduated from 2-year college 0.03     
Graduated college (2-year/4-year unspecified) 0.11 +0.7 0.34 
Graduated from 4-year college 0.07 −0.2 0.85 
        
Employment 1.00     
Unemployed 0.05     
Employed, full-time (> 35 hours per week) 0.58 +0.16 0.84 
Employed, part-time (< 35 hours per week) 0.24 −0.62 0.44 
Not working (homemakers, retired, disabled) 0.04 −0.25 0.82 
Student, not working 0.06 −0.6 0.51 
Student, also working 0.03 −0.21 0.86 
        
Employee of IDA host organization       
No 0.98     
Yes 0.02 +0.09 0.94 
        
Self-employment in microenterprise       
None 0.80     
Active 0.07 −1.3 0.29 
Inactive 0.14 +0.07 0.91 
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 Table 3: Income and public assistance 
 
Independent variable Mean 
Change in 
% points p-value 
Household income ($100/month)       
Recurrent income (2-piece spline) −11.4     
0 to $799 −4.8 0.00 1.00 
$800 or more −6.6 +0.05 0.62 
        
Intermittent income −2.2 −0.02 0.74 
        
Receipt of public assistance       
TANF or AFDC never −0.62     
TANF or AFDC formerly −0.38 −0.09 0.86 
        
TANF currently −0.10 +0.76 0.27 
        
No SSI/SSDI −0.89     
Receives SSI/SSDI −0.11 +0.10 0.91 
        
No food stamps −0.79     
Receives food stamps −0.21 −1.0 0.23 
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 Table 4: Assets, liabilities, and insurance 
 
Independent variable Mean 
Change in 
% points p-value 
        
Liquid assets       
No passbook savings account 0.48     
Owned passbook savings account 0.52 −0.23 0.59 
        
Balance in passbook savings account ($100s) 2.36 +0.04 0.18 
        
No checking account 0.34     
Owned checking account 0.66 −0.6 0.22 
        
Balance in checking account ($100s) 2.11 −0.09 0.20 
        
Illiquid assets       
Renter 0.85     
Home owner 0.15 −0.41 0.68 
        
No car 0.37     
Car owner 0.63 −1.1 0.05 
        
Value of illiquid assets ($100s) 112 0.000 0.99 
        
Liabilities       
No debt 0.35     
Some debt 0.65 +0.8 0.09 
        
Value of liabilities ($100s) 89 0.000 0.99 
        
Insurance coverage       
No health insurance 0.34     
Had health insurance 0.66 +0.36 0.65 
        
No life insurance 0.68     
Had life insurance 0.32 −1.5 0.14 
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 Table 5: Enrollment characteristics 
 
Independent variable Mean 
Change in 
% points p-value 
Previous relationship with host organization      
No 0.59     
Yes 0.41 +0.34 0.53 
        
Referred by partner organization       
No 0.70     
Yes 0.30 +1.0 0.13 
        
Date of enrollment       
Before June 30, 1999 0.58     
After June 30, 1999 0.42 −6.4 0.01 
        
Months of participation (5-piece spline) 13.3     
1 to 6 5.7 −1.0 0.01 
7 to 12 3.8 −0.45 0.02 
13 to 18 2.2 −0.7 0.01 
19 to 24 1.2 −0.54 0.02 
24 or more 0.4 −0.24 0.47 
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 Table 6: Number of accounts and direct deposit 
 
Independent variable Mean 
Change in 
% points p-value 
Number of accounts       
One 0.99     
More than one 0.01 +4.6 0.02 
        
Use of direct deposit to IDA account       
No 0.95     
Yes 0.05 −2.7 0.17 
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 Table 7: Program-design characteristics 
 
Independent variable Mean 
Change in 
% points p-value 
        
Match rate       
1:1 0.24 +4.7 0.01 
2:1 0.51 +3.7 0.01 
3:1 0.14 +1.6 0.14 
4:1 to 7:1 0.06   
        
Match cap       
Monthly savings target 43 −0.05 0.01 
        
Match-cap structure       
Annual 0.56     
Lifetime 0.44 −1.0 0.27 
        
Program inputs per participant per month     
Salaried IDA staff (hours) 2.8 +1.2 0.07 
Partner staff (hours) 0.5 −0.88 0.16 
Volunteer staff (hours) 1.1 +0.06 0.90 
        
Salary expense ($) 46 −0.02 0.62 
Non-salary expense ($) 24 0.00 1.00 
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 Table 8: Program fixed effects 
 
Independent variable Mean 
Change in 
% points p-value 
        
CAPTC Large-scale 0.19   
CVCAC (ADD/AFIA) 0.02 +4 0.12 
Human Solutions 0.05 +11 0.01 
CAAB (ADD/AFIA) 0.03 +13 0.01 
CVCAC 0.07 +13 0.01 
EBALDC  0.10 +13 0.01 
Heart of America 0.04 +14 0.01 
Shorebank 0.09 +14 0.01 
MACED 0.02 +14 0.01 
CAPTC Small-scale 0.07 +15 0.01 
ADVOCAP 0.03 +15 0.01 
CTMHA 0.05 +15 0.01 
Alternatives FCU 0.04 +16 0.01 
CAAB 0.04 +17 0.01 
Near Eastside 0.08 +19 0.01 
WSEP (ADD/AFIA) 0.04 +22 0.01 
WSEP 0.06 +23 0.01 
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